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WHAT GOOD IS HABEAS? 
Aziz Z. Huq* 
This essay examines empirically the effect of the 
Supreme Court's 2008 judgment in Boumediene v. 
Bush. Boumediene marked a sharp temporal break 
because it introduced a new regime of constitutionally 
mandated habeas jurisdiction for non-citizens detained 
as "enemy combatants" at Guantanamo. The 
Boumediene Court envisaged habeas jurisdiction as 
serving a twofold purpose. First, it claimed habeas 
vindicates physical liberty interests in line with a 
longstanding historical understanding of the writ. 
Second, the Court viewed habeas as a mechanism to 
generate or preserve legal boundaries on executive 
discretion. This essay gathers empirical evidence of the 
opinion's effect up to January 2010 to determine whether 
these goals were fulfilled. While the data is in many 
respects ambiguous, it suggests the effect of Boumediene 
on detention policy was not as significant as many 
believe. For example, less than four percent of releases 
from the Cuban base have followed a judicial order of 
release. Even in those cases, it is unclear if judicial action 
or something else caused release. Because the effects of 
habeas jurisdiction have been uncertain and perhaps 
marginal, effusive praise or blame of the Court's 2008 
decision is premature. 
Few axioms of constitutional law seem more self-evident 
today than the proposition that the Great Writ of habeas corpus, 
as protected by the Suspension Clause,1 is a "vital instrument for 
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1. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 9, cl. 2. 
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the protect ion of individual liberty."2 Also largely common 
ground is the idea that habeas at its "historical core . . . has 
served as a means of reviewing the legality of executive 
detention. "3 So understood, the habeas writ ranks as "an 
essential mechanism in the separation-of-powers scheme. "4 It is 
one of the "necessary constitutional means" vested by the 
Constitution's text in one branch "to resist encroachments of the 
others" as part of a "constant aim . . .  to divide and arrange the 
several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on 
the other. "5 The integration of habeas into a larger account of 
the Constitution's separation-of-powers architecture played a 
prominent role in J ustice Kennedy's recent maj ority opinion in 
Boumediene v. Bush,6 which has been labeled "one of the most 
important Supreme Court decisions in recent years."7 Even 
Boumediene's critics do not doubt habeas has policy 
consequences, although they profess to be "mystif[ied] " as to 
why a check on executive detention power is necessary.8 
This essay questions the conventional wisdom about habeas 
as a "check" on the executive branch. In Boumediene, the 
Supreme Court supplied a twofold normative j ustifi cation for 
constitutional habeas j urisdiction: It first directly promotes 
physical liberty, and second reinforces the separation of powers 
by preserving a limited government via enforcement of 
unambiguous legal constraints on the executive branch. Using 
the aftermath of Boumediene as a case study, I argue that the 
resulting habeas j urisdiction has had at best a complex, largely 
indirect, effect on detention policy. In the end, the impact of 
habeas is far more ambiguous than either critics or supporters of 
Boumediene have recognized. Harsh criticism and extravagant 
2. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246 (2008). 
3. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). 
4. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246. 
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. , 
1961). 
6. 128 S. Ct. at 2246; cf. Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access to 
Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2110 (2009) ("The 
Boumediene majority opinion expressly invokes the separation of powers in at least ten 
additional passages.") .  
7.  Ronald Dworkin, Why It  Was a Great Victory, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 14, 2008, 
at 18. 
8. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: 
SECURITY, LIBERTY AND THE COURTS 256 (2007) ("There is no reason to think that the 
executive would benefit from an excessive detention or conviction rate, or that political 
constraints would permit the executive to implement such a preference in any event."). 
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praise of the Court should both be tempered in the teeth of 
persisti ng empirical uncertainty. 
Empirical and doctrinal data for this essay are drawn from 
litigation and judicial opinions following the Supreme Court's 
Boumediene opinion. Boumediene concerned the scope of 
judicial supervision of detention operations at the Guantanamo 
B ay Naval Base in Cuba. Boumediene marked a temporal break 
because it introduced a new regime of constitutionally mandated 
habeas jurisdiction. Until J une 12, 2008, there was doubt about 
the availability of habeas for non-citizens detained as "enemy 
combatants" at Guantanamo. It was "widely assumed that the 
Court would not intervene to invalidate executive action clearly 
authorized by statute that implicated military matters and 
foreign policy during a time of war. "9 So for many J ustice 
Kennedy's maj ority opinion for the Court was a surprise. It also 
set in motion a new line of district court litigation -the "enemy 
combatant" habeas- with novel procedural rules, substantive 
standards invented on the fly, and few preexisting expectations. 
That litigation provides evidence of Boumediene's effect on the 
Executive's policy options. While natural experiments about 
constitutional design choices are rare,10 Boumediene sets up an 
opportunity to examine (no doubt through a cloudy lens) the 
effect of one abrupt shift in constitutional design. 
Part I of the essay describes Boumediene and situates the 
Court's theory of habeas as part of the separation of powers. 
Part II analyzes the consequences of post-Boumediene litigation. 
I examine first empirical data about detainee policy, and then 
turn to the doctrinal aftermath. Part III offers some tentative 
explanations for data presented in Part II, while underscoring 
quite how much remains empirically elusive. 
I 
What role does habeas jurisdiction, as guaranteed by the 
Suspension Clause, play in the constitutional order?11 According 
9. Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 39 (2009). 
10. We cannot, for instance, unspool history's tape to see what would be different 
if, say, the Framers had prohibited textual supermajority rules explicitly in both federal 
legislative chambers. Cf GARY KING, ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, 
DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 77-
78 (1994) (arguing for a counterfactual definition of causality). 
1 1. I leave aside two largely settled questions here to focus on the "historical core" 
of federal court habeas: First, should the Suspension Clause be read to guarantee state 
388 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:385 
to Justice Kennedy's Boumediene opinion, habeas jurisdiction 
not only promotes liberty but also plays a prominent function in 
the separation of powers.12 But the strong connection between 
habeas and the separation of powers elaborated by Justice 
Kennedy is neither obvious nor necessary. To the contrary, it is 
of recent vintage, and finds roots as much in Justice Kennedy's 
views on structural constitutionalism as it does in the storied 
history of the Great Writ. 
A recent comprehensive account of habeas's origins in its 
original early English context has argued that the writ early on 
was not a liberty-promoting restraint but "fundamentally an 
instrument by which the sovereign, through his judges, might 
ensure that his authority w as not abused whenever an officer 
acting in the k ing's name imprisoned someone."13 On this 
account, habeas was at its inception not a tool for dispersing 
power within government. Even its later celebration as a limit on 
"arbitrary government" was largely a "fiction."14 Until at 
minimum the seventeenth century, habeas operated in a political 
regime wherein "every . . .  instrument of authority in England 
shared the same legal and conceptual source: the k ing. "15 In this 
context, it was at best a mechanism for reducing the cost of 
agency slack for the government's sole principal - the monarch.16 
habeas jurisdiction over federal custody? The Supreme Court rejected this position more 
than a century ago. See, e.g., Tarble's Case, 80, U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411-12 (1872) . In any 
case, it is hard to see how state habeas could play this ambitious role now without 
reworking the state court bench and fundamentally altering the larger political 
relationship of the states to the federal government. Second, does the Constitution 
require federal court habeas review of state court criminal judgments even absent the 
statutory authority created in 1867? See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385-386. I 
thus do not take up the debate as to whether the 1789 Judiciary Act would have allowed 
the federal courts to supervise state criminal proceedings. 
12. See text accompanying notes 31 to 55. 
13 .  Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, 
Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 587 (2008); see also 
WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 14-17 ( 1980) 
(tracing habeas's function back to Norman consolidation of government power). In his 
magisterial new history of habeas, Halliday provides a compelling account of this 
monarchical usage of the writ. See PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM 
ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 64-95 (2010). According to Halliday's account, the writ was also 
the King's means for protecting the liberty of his subjects; it played, that is, a double­
edged role. 
14. DUKER, supra note 13,  at 40-41 (describing interactions of the Court of 
Common Pleas and the Privy Council) . 
15 .  Halliday & White, supra note 13, at 595 n.43. 
16. Moreover, it was a mechanism for centralizing jurisdiction in the King's Bench. 
See DUKER, supra note 13, at 33-40. This is the inverse of its purported role under the 
separation of powers. 
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It was a means for the k ing to rein in potentially wayward 
vassals. 
By contrast, in the American context the Framers proposed 
a federal government designed "first [to] enable the government 
to control the governed; and in the next place [to] oblige it to 
control itself. " 17 The principal in the American model is 
obviously no longer a k ing or centr al executive, but "the 
people. "  To control agency costs in this new model, which arose 
from unavoidable slack between the people's instructions and 
their repre sentatives' actions, James Madison emphasiz ed above 
all elections as tools to enable popular monitoring and control of 
elected agents. 18 But he also praised the fragmentation and 
allocation of government power across three branches as an 
"auxiliary" design feature to dampen the misuse of power. 19 
Habeas tak es on a new role in this new context. In one 
regard, American habeas is less significant than its English 
cousin. In the English context, recent histories have argued, 
access to habeas was a "critical mark er of subjecthood," an 
indicia of the bond between subject and sovereign monarchy. 20 
There is no evidence I k now of from the American context that 
habeas has had quite the same symbolic weight. 21 On the 
contrary, what is strik ing is how marginal a role habeas plays in 
the Federalist Papers ' canonical account of the separation of 
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); 
accord Halliday & White, supra note 13, at 672-73. It would be an error to think the 
Framers did not understand this shift. Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist 84 argued 
that bills of rights were inapposite in the American context because they are "in their 
origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects." THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 512 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
18. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 ,  at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. , 
1961) (describing "dependence on the people" as "the primary control of the 
government.") .  Agency costs might be reduced by either monitoring or selection. See 
generally TIMOTHY BESLEY, PRINCIPLED AGENTS? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
GOOD GOVERNANCE 99 (2006) (discussing agency problems in constitutional design). 
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 ,  at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. ,  1961). 
I do not mean to suggest that Madison thought that the principal's view could be reduced 
to aggregated democratic preferences. Nor do I address the surprisingly complex 
question of why (or even whether) fragmentation promotes good outcomes. See M. 
Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1 127, 
1155-57 (2000) ("The exact reasons for a prohibition on the accumulation of government 
functions is surprisingly difficult to pin down.") [hereinafter Magill, Real Separation] . 
20. Halliday & White, supra note 13,  at 634. 
21. Professor Oaks's account of habeas in the states suggests that Founding-era 
evidence of habeas's significance is at best ambiguous. See Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas 
Corpus in the States-1776-1867, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 247-51 (1965) (discussing early 
state constitutional treatment of habeas, and noting, inter alia, that in 1787 only four 
states' constitutions guaranteed it). 
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powers, despite the fact that the suspension clause is one of the 
only individual rights guarantees in the original Constitution of 
1787. In the Federalist 84, Alexander Hamilton devoted only a 
handful of sentences to describe habeas as a remedy for a 
particular harbinger of tyranny- the "secretly hurrying" of a 
person off the jail out of public sight.22 Madison's classic 
explication of separated powers, earlier in the Federalist Papers, 
does not linger on habeas. Hence, even if habeas was significant 
to the Framers, the writ was not a central architectural feature of 
the new Constitution's dispersion of powers, as least as described 
in the Federalist Papers. 
Subsequent American debates about habeas have centered 
on the scope of legislative control over the writ. In one of the 
first judicial expositions of the writ's meaning, Chief Justice 
Marshall seemed to split the difference, holding that power to 
award the writ "must be given by written law," but once 
jurisdiction had vested, "the meaning of the term habeas 
corpus," would be given "unquestionably [by] . . .  the common 
law."23 Even in the twentieth century, there was still no 
consensus as to how habeas operated. In 2001, a view of habeas 
as a weak ,  essentially majoritarian institution still persuaded a 
substantial minority of the Supreme Court. Writing for four 
dis senting Ju stices, Justice Scalia argued that the Suspension 
Clause "does not guarantee any content to ( or even the 
existence of) the writ of habeas corpus," but rather regulated 
one particular species of majoritarian abuse link ed to 
emergencies.24 On Justice Scalia's view, constitutional habeas 
regulates agency costs largely by mak ing suspension turn on 
legislative preferences. Unsuspended, the writ falls within 
plenary congressional control.25 At most, this might preclude the 
Executive from asserting a unilateral "Merryman power" to 
ignore a court's command absent suspension.26 By Justice 
22. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
23. Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807) .  
24. INS v .  St. Cyr, 533 U.S .  289, 337-39 (2001) (Scalia, J . ,  dissenting). 
25. Justice Scalia's account of habeas in effect accepts Robert Dahl's critique of 
Madisonian democracy as in tension with majoritarian democracy. See ROBERT A. 
DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 31-33 (rev. ed. 2006). 
26. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). Michael 
Stokes Paulsen usefully describes President Lincoln's refusal to honor judicial process in 
Merryman as an example of "autonomous executive branch interpretation." Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive 
Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81 ,  83 (1993). 
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S calia's admission, this is hardly a robust bulwark of separation 
of powers. 
The c ase law also contains a stronger view of habeas as an 
instrument for the preservation of human liberty from arbitrary 
executive branch action. Habeas, of course, has long been 
associated with freedom from physical constraint.27 In 1963, at 
the dawn of habeas's revival as an instrument of state-court 
regulation, Justice Brennan explained that habeas's "function 
has been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for 
whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints. "28 Habeas, 
he contended, redressed "denials of due process of law."29 In 
2001, a majority of the Court in INS v. St. Cyr further styled the 
writ as a "means of reviewing the legality of executive 
detention" to ensure compliance with legislated limitations, 
including the availability vel non of discretionary relief from 
deportation.30 Liberty in St. Cyr was tied to legality. But Justice 
S tevens's St. Cyr opinion did not articulate a more general or 
abstract account of how habeas furthers the separation of 
powers. 
A more substantial integration of habeas into a larger 
account of separation of p owers occurs in Justice Kennedy's 
2008 Boumediene opinion.3 Boumediene's refinement, however, 
may be best understand as part of a more general theory of 
separation of powers that Justice Kennedy has developed over 
three decades in cases unrelated to habeas or the Suspension 
Clause. To understand this theory, it is helpful to consider first 
Boumediene's holding and then to situate the case against the 
back drop of Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence. In doing so, I do 
not suggest Justice Kennedy is the first to articulate a role for 
habeas in the separation of powers, but rather that his view is 
consequential in this context. 
Boumediene held that non-citiz en detainees at the 
Guantanamo Bay Na val Base "have the habeas corpus 
27. See, e.g., Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961) (calling habeas "the highest 
safeguard of liberty"). 
28. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963). Obviously, this diverged from the 
canonical understanding of many English legal historians. See Dallin H. Oaks, Legal 
History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451 ,  459-68 (1966). 
29. Fay, 372 U.S. at 402. 
30. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); id. at 303-04. 
31 .  Eric Posner has fairly noted that Boumediene also "turns on an implicit theory 
about the rights of noncitizens . . .  that is prior to the conception of separation of 
powers." Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism, 2007-08 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 23 (2007) (emphasis in original). 
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privilege" notwithstanding legislation eliminating statutory 
habeas jurisdiction for their petitions.32 Justice Kennedy's 
opinion began by ask ing whether the scope of the writ in 1789 
provided guidance as to the territorial scope of the writ or its 
application to enemy aliens today.33 Finding no clear answer to 
these questions in Founding-era materials, Justice Kennedy 
invok ed instead a originalist understanding of habeas's purpose 
to inform a contemporary reading of the Suspension Clause. 
Habeas's English history, Kennedy suggested, demonstrated that 
"pendular swings to and away from individual liberty were 
endemic to undivided, uncontrolled power. "34 In Kennedy's 
account, the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act was a watershed in the 
development of liberal limited government.35 (Historians, by 
contrast, have cast that law as "merely codif[ying] " judicial 
practices and not preventing "important innovations" via 
common law elaboration36) . Reasoning from that historical 
example, Justice Kennedy then articulated a strong connection 
between "the protection of individual liberties" and the 
American "separation-of-powers scheme."37 Liberty and the 
separation of powers are thus intertwined. 
Justice Kennedy then suggest ed that "the Suspension 
Clause" -or rather the jurisdiction guaranteed against 
displacement by that Clause - "is designed to protect against . . .  
cyclical abuses [during emergencies] ," by ensuring that "except 
during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a 
time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the ' delicate balance of 
government. "'38 The writ's protections thus do not reside solely 
in the fact that it imposes publicity and political costs on an 
32. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008). 
33. Id. at 2244; see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 (noting that "at the absolute 
minimum the Suspension Clause protects the writ as it existed in 1789") .  
34.  Boumediene, 128 S. Ct.  at 2246. 
35. Id. at 2245-46 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *137). 
36. Halliday & White, supra note 13, at 611-12; see also id. at 611. ("A persistent 
misapprehension about the English history of habeas is that the 'Great Writ' was a 
parliamentary rather than a judicial gift."). 
37. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246. Because the separation of powers serves to limit 
government power generally, Justice Kennedy explained, its discrete manifestations, such 
as habeas and the requirements of bicameralism and presentment, benefit not only 
citizens but also "foreign nationals who have the privilege of litigating in our courts." Id. 
(citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983) (invalidating legislative veto)). 
38. Id. at 2247 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality 
op.)); cf Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963) ("It is no accident that habeas corpus has 
time and again played a central role in national crises wherein the claims of order and 
liberty clash most acutely."). 
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abrogation of the writ as Justice Scalia suggested.39 Rather, it is 
the ordinary availability of federal courts' habeas jurisdiction 
that promotes both liberty and the separation of powers. 
The opinion, however, does not clearly articulate the way in 
which habeas jurisdiction will play this function. Justice Kennedy 
provided but vague guidance as to either the procedural 
contours or the substantive standards that would be applied in 
determining eligibility for habeas relief.40 The closest the 
Boumediene opinion come s  to specifying a mechanism for 
constraining government is a passage concerning the 
Constitution's ratification debates, in which Justice Kennedy 
claims that the Suspension Clause guarant ees "an affirmative 
right to judicial inquiry into the causes of detention. "41 Later in 
the opinion, he characteriz es the habeas inquiry as encompassing 
"a meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the 
Executive's power to detain."42 While Justice Kennedy does not 
go on to explain how this serves the separation of powers, his 
logic seemed to build on Justice Stevens' St Cyr opinion: The 
fu nction of habeas jurisdiction, on this account, is to ensure 
compliance by the Executive with existing legal rules that cabin 
executive authority to detain.43 An additional premise seems to 
be that the enforcement of legal constraints on the detention 
power plays a spe cial role in the separation of powers because of 
the centrality of physical liberty to political competition and 
debate .44 
Nor does the Boumediene opinion contain a general account 
of the separation of powers. The latter is a complex and 
contested idea that comprises ideas a bout both separation and 
equilibrium between branches.45 But while Boumediene has little 
39. See Amanda Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 687 
(2009) (arguing that "exercises of the [suspension] power must be closely guarded and 
carefully checked to ensure that the power is not invoked except in the most dire of 
national emergencies"). 
40. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2266-67. 
41. Id. at 2246. 
42. Id. at 2269. 
43. Another view would look to other constitutional entitlements as being 
protected by the Suspension Clause. See Tyler, supra note 39, at 682 (" [W]here a 
[constitutional] right is arguably bound up with the Great Writ, it is protected from 
blanket displacement by the Suspension Clause's terms."). 
44. Cf Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J. , dissenting) 
("Even more important than the method of selecting the people's rulers and their 
successors is the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the rule of 
law.") .  
45. For a penetrating critique of several accounts of separation of powers, see M. 
Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. 
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to say on the matter, its author, Justice Kennedy, has given 
considerable thought to the separation of powers since he 
penned the Ninth Circuit's opinion in INS v. Chadha.46 In 
Boumediene, he cites two of his own earlier Supreme Court 
opinions discussing the separation of powers.47 Earlier Kennedy 
jurisprudence should therefore inform a reading of 
Boumediene's characteriz ation of habeas and the separation of 
powers. 
As early as the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Chadha, then­
Judge Kennedy articulated a distinctive vision of separation of 
powers in the service of individual liberty. Writing for the Court 
of Appeals, he identified two "principal purposes" of the 
separation of powers: "preventing concentrations of power 
dangerous to liberty and ...  promoting governmental eff iciency. "48 
The Chadha opinion, however, does not explain how these goals 
are to be reconciled in cases they conflict. It is thus only a first 
step toward a general account of the separation of powers. 
As a Justice, Kennedy elaborated his understanding of the 
separation of power. The efficiency motif by and large vanishes 
from his opinions.49 By contrast, Justice Kennedy has vigorously 
pressed the theme of liberty. He has highlighted in particular a 
"fundamental political sense" of liberty that "inheres in 
[governmental] structure" absent any enumeration of 
constitutional rights. 50 People benefit from "fundamental 
L. REV. 603, 604 (2001) (arguing that "both commitments at the center of separation of 
powers doctrine [separation and balance] are misconceived"); id. at 609, n .13 (collecting 
other views). 
46. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
47. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246 (citing Loving v. United States, 5 17 U.S. 748 
(1996); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
48. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 425; id. at 422-24 (describing the separation of powers first, 
as a means to prevent "unnecessary and therefore dangerous concentration of power in 
one branch" and second, as a "practical measure to facilitate administration of a large 
nation" by precluding "cumbersome entanglement" of Congress in laws' administration). 
Kennedy's other Ninth Circuit opinion that addresses separation of powers takes the 
formalist approach directed by Chief Justice Burger's Chadha opinion. See Pacemaker 
Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instrumedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(upholding 28 U.S.C. §636(c), which allows magistrates to conduct civil trials with all 
parties' consent). 
49. It briefly resurfaces, for example, in Hein v. Freedom from Religion 
Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 616 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Executive 
Branch should be free, as a general matter, to discover new ideas, to understand pressing 
public demands, and to find creative responses to address governmental concerns."), and 
Loving v. United States, 5 17 U.S. 748, 757-58 (1996) (connecting the separation of 
powers to "effective and accountable" government). See also Magill, Real Separation, 
supra note 19, at 1 184 (discussing efficiency as a separation-of-powers value). 
50. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
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political" liberty, on this account, when they delegate political 
power to a government in which "one branch of government 
[does] not possess the power to shar e their destiny without a 
sufficient check from the other two." For Justice Kennedy, this 
proves especially so in moments of crisis.52 Liberty, for Justice 
K ennedy, is a state of mind. It is the psychological assurance that 
each element of government will be check ed by other elements. 53 
So " [w]hen structure fails, liberty is always in peril"54 because 
such assurance evaporates. It follows that "fundamental 
political" liberty is best promoted by clear, unambiguous limits 
on government power.55 
There is, no doubt, a touch of the ineffable to all this. But 
Boumediene's authorship and its citations nonetheless suggest 
the Court tak es it seriously. 
To summariz e, the function of post-Boumediene habeas 
jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees' petitions is a twofold 
protection of liberty interests. First, habeas vindicates physical 
liberty interests in line with a longstanding historical 
understanding of the writ. Second, it is also, and perhaps more 
significantly, a mechanism to generate or preserve legal 
boundaries on executive discretion so as to ensure what Justice 
K ennedy has called fundamental political liberty. That value in 
tum is intertwined with the Constitution's separation of powers. 
II 
Boumediene created a rare opportunity to consider the 
effects of habeas jurisdiction. Does habeas directly benefit 
concurring). 
51. Id.; see also Loving, 517 U.S. at 756 (" [S]eparation of powers [is] a defense 
against tyranny."). So defined, "political liberty" is separate and distinct from any 
substantive conception of rights. Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468 
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("It remains one of the most vital 
functions of this Court to police with care the separation of the governing powers. That is 
so even when, as is the case here, no immediate threat to liberty is apparent."). 
52. Cf Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 637 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
("Respect for laws derived from the customary operation of the Executive and the 
Legislative Branches gives some assurance of stability in time of crisis." Justice Kennedy 
joined Justice Breyer's concurrence).  
53. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 451 ("The individual loses liberty in a real sense if 
[government policy] is not subject to traditional constitutional constraints."). 
54. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 468 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
55. For a different analysis of the interests served by judicial review in detention 
cases, see Daphne Barak-Erez & Matthew C. Waxman, Secret Evidence and the Due 
Process of Terrorist Detentions, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 3 (2009) (distinguishing 
interests in individual dignity, accuracy, and systemic regulation). 
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human liberty in the sense of ending unlawful detentions that in 
the absence of jurisdiction's exercise would continue? Does it 
enlarge liberty in Justice Kennedy's "fundamental political" 
sense of promoting a constrained federal government? This 
sect ion considers both questions by examining the aftermath of 
the Boumediene decision. I first sk etch the back ground to the 
Supreme Court's Boumediene opinion. I then identify sources of 
evidence about its effects .  In the central section of this paper, I 
consider the evidence of Boumediene's direct effect on detention 
policy at Guantanamo. I turn then to the less tractable question 
whether Boumediene had consequences for "fundamental 
political" liberty by considering the way in whic h  the opinion 
changed or confirmed the black -letter law of executive 
detention. 
A 
Boumediene provides a rare glimpse at separation-of­
powers jurisprudence's effect on the ground.56 Boumediene 
abruptly changed expectations about the exercise of habeas 
jurisdiction over petitions from Guantanamo. It was the first 
time the Supreme Court had invalidated a federal statute 
purporting to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts.57 And 
it did so even after the Court had initially signaled, via a 
threshold denial of certiorari ( later reconsidered) , that it did not 
intend to police executive policy choices closely.5 W hile its effect 
was not quite a shift from "no jurisdiction" to "plenary 
jurisdiction," Boumediene st ill disrupted government actors' 
expectations about detention policy's exposure to judicial 
supervision. To understand why requires some back ground 
about the detention policy at issue. 
In its on gm s, the military detention operation at 
Guantanamo was crafted to be beyond federal court jurisdiction. 
Before the first detainees were transported to the base, although 
not before construction of detention facilities, government 
lawyers had concluded that the federal courts lack ed jurisdiction 
over the base.59 Habeas actions first filed on behalf of detainees 
56. This paper is hardly novel in proposing such an inquiry. For a pathbreaking 
example of such analysis, see JESSICA KORN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION (1998) 
(studying the effects of abrogation of the legislative veto in Chadha). 
57. Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantanamo: The 
Boumediene Decision, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1; see also id. at 13-20 (describing case). 
58. See Boumediene v. Bush, 551U.S.1161 (2007) (mem.). 
59. Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of 
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in February 2002 were answered by threshold motions to dismiss 
on jurisdictional grounds.60 The Supreme Court's 2004 statutory 
ruling in Rasul v. Bush,61 affirming the availability of statutory 
jurisdiction, precipitated the filing of many habeas petitions. 
Congress, however, responded to Rasul by stripping habeas and 
channeling cases into a new jurisdictional avenue in the District 
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals under the 2005 Detainee 
Treatment A ct ( "DTA") .62 That jurisdictional strip was 
reaffirmed by Congress in 2006.63 
Due to the DTA review mechanism, Boumediene hardly 
wrote on a jurisdictional tabla rasa. Yet uncertainty still obtained 
about the scope of Court of Appeals review under the DT A. 
One year before Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit had defined the 
record for the purposes of this new avenue of review to include 
all "reasonably available information in the possession of the 
U .S. Government bearing on the issue of whether the detainee 
meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant. "64 
This ruling prompted vigorous protests from the government, 
which argued it did not have all "reasonably available" 
information, and that gathering "reasonably available" 
information would be prohibitively burdensome.65 Such protest 
suggests that circuit court review under the DT A might have had 
real bite.66 We will never k now. This avenue of review was 
Defense from Patrick Philbin and John C. Yoo, "Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over 
Aliens Held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba" (December 28, 2001), http:// 
commons. wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2001 1228-philbin-yoo-guan tanamo-habeus-memo. pdf; 
cf KAREN GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO'S FIRST 100 DAYS 
43 (2009) (describing initial construction before then). 
60. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S .  Ct. 2229, 2241 (2008). 
61. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
62. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119  Stat. 2680 (2005) 
(codified at 10 U.S.C.§ 801, 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)) [hereinafter DTA]. 
63. See Military Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) 
(codified in part at 28 U.S.C.§ 2241 (2006)) [hereinafter MCA]. 
64. Bismullah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Department of 
Defense regulations), petition for reh'g en bane denied, 514 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(per curiam). 
65. See Bismullah, 514 F.3d at 1306-07 (Brown, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en bane) (summarizing and endorsing government's complaints) .  It is 
impossible not to observe that the government was in effect claiming that it could lock up 
men for eight, going on nine years, without process, even though it did not have at hand 
"reasonably available" information pertaining to that detention decision. 
66. At least in some instances, a habeas petitioner's ability to seek discovery and 
introduce exculpatory evidence in ways that the DTA would not have allowed may have 
been outcome dispositive. See, e.g., Al-Rabiah v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 2d 11 ,  22-24 
(D.D.C. 2009) (granting petition based on exculpatory evidence based on extensive 
discovery by petitioner's counsel). I am grateful to Baher Azmy for drawing my attention 
to Al Rabiah. 
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exercised in only one case prior to Boumediene.67 Still, its 
availability means that the legal effect of Boumediene was only a 
change in the k ind of judicial oversight, not an absolute shift in 
its availability. 
New judicial superintendence took the form of 
individualiz ed district court litigation in the District of Columbia 
District Court. That litigation did not begin quick ly after 
Boumediene. Initially, Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan 
consolidated the habeas cases and in November 2008 issued a 
case management order stipulating rules for discovery, the 
content and order of filing, and burdens of proof.68 Not all judges 
followed Chief Judge Hogan's lead. Judge Richard Leon moved 
forward separately. On November 20, 2008, Judge Leon became 
the first district court judge to resolve a Guantanamo habeas 
petition.69 Numerous other district court judges have followed 
suit in reaching the merits of habeas actions. Judges have 
reached a variety of procedural rulings and sk etched divergent 
accounts of the scope of deten tion authority. In March 2009, the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in a long­
pending interlocutory appeal resolving some procedural 
questions concerning classified evidence and the scope of 
discovery.70 In January 2010, the court of appeals issued its first 
ruling concerning the scope of detention authority with respect 
to Guantanamo detainees.71 As of this writing, the post­
Boumediene habeas is very much a work in progress. 
The post-Boumediene inception of habeas did not mark the 
beginning of releases from Guantanamo. Releases have been 
ongoing since at least 2003. On December 16, 2008, just before 
the first detainees who obtained final relief from a federal court 
67. See Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (granting detainees' petitions 
for review). 
68. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig. , No. 08-0442 (TFH), 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 97095, at *96 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008). Judge Hogan was selected as coordinating 
judge to handle uniform procedural issues in the cases so that they could be "addressed 
as expeditiously as possible as required by the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush." 
Resolution of the Executive Session (D.D.C. July 1 ,  2008), http://www.dcd.uscourts. 
gov/public-docs/system/files/Guantanamo-Resolution070108.pdf. Judges Richard Leon 
and Emmett Sullivan declined to transfer their cases. Sarah Lorr, Note, Reconciling 
Classified Evidence and A Petitioner's Right to a "Meaningful Review" at Guantanamo 
Bay: A Legislative Solution, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2671 n.13 (2009). 
69. Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2008). 
70. Al-Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539, 546-47 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) 
(explaining that procedural issues would be resolved by analogy to the DT A mechanisms 
and criminal trial procedures). 
71. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
2010] WHAT GOOD IS HABEAS? 399 
were released, there were 248 detainees in the facility.72 Since the 
facility opened in 2002 through 2008, 779 prisoners had been 
detained there.73 Habeas, therefore, operated against the 
back drop of an ongoing circulation of prisoners and ongoing 
efforts to process the prison population for release. One result of 
these changes has been an alleged "shift in the detainee 
population [at Guantanamo] toward al-Qaeda personnel and 
away from Afghan Taliban and foreign fighters. "74 That is, as 
more and more detainees have been processed, the remaini ng 
population increasingly comprises individuals alleged to have 
closer connections to terrorist groups as opposed to their allies. 
By the end of 2009, about a year into the Obama 
presidency, there was thus a significant body of evidence 
comprising judicial opinions and policy changes about the 
operation of constitutionally mandated habeas. This evidence of 
habeas's operation up through the end of January 2010,75 
moreover, can usefully be set alongside evidence about 
detention operations prior to Boumediene, when only an 
uncertain quantum of judicial review under the DTA was 
obtained. The two sets of evidence enable a rough evaluation of 
the effects of constitutionally mandated habeas jurisdiction. 
B 
To test the Court's aspirations for habeas, it is necessary to 
look at patterns of detention and release before and after 
Boumediene. In introducing this evidence, it is worth 
emphasiz ing again that it does not come from a controlled 
experiment. Rather, it comprises observations before and after 
June 2008. The data certainly cannot show whether any observed 
change to release decisions and rates is caused by habeas or by 
another unobserved variable. At best, this data allows us to 
suggest what might plausibly be the case, to rule out some 
hypotheses, and to identify possible unobserved variables. It 
emphatically is not evidence of causation. 
Accurate data about detention operations at the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base has long been hard to secure. As 
72. BENJAMIN WITTES & ZAAHIRA WYNE, THE CURRENT DETAINEE 
POPULATION OF GUANTANAMO: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 1 (2008) , http://www.brookings. 
edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/1216_detainees_ wittes/1216_detainees_ wi ttes. pdf. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 2. 
75. The data for this article was gathered in December 2009 and January 2010. The 
article does not address subsequent developments. 
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the Brook ings Institution has observed, "the government has 
never identified the interned population in a contemporaneous 
fashion. "76 The data used for this paper are derived from several 
sources. First and most importantly, information about the date 
and volume of releases or transfers, the net detainee population 
at Guantanamo, and the total numbers of detainees released or 
transferred at any point in time has been drawn from statements 
and releases by the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. 
Department of Justice.77 Arguably, data about the timing of 
releases is secondary in importance to data about the timing of 
internal decisions to release, if the latter better reflect the impact 
of judicial action on executive behavior. But the latter data is not 
publically available. Until the transition from the Bush to the 
Obama Administration, primary responsibility for releasing data 
rested with the Department of Defense. After January 2009, 
data was released instead by the Department of Justice. In a 
break from Pentagon practice, the latter has not been releasing 
information on the total number of detainees remaining at the 
Cuban base ( although that data is occasionally available via 
press reports) .  
The second source of  information concerning the habeas 
litigation used for this article is not governmental. Rather, 
nongovernmental actors such as the New York Times, 
ProPublica, and the Brook ings Institute have developed data 
bases. Rather than reconstructing this data from scratch, I have 
chosen to rely on these existing sources. The data presented here 
was thus drawn initially from databases developed by the New 
York Times and ProPublica. 78 It was cross- check ed against the 
Westlaw database and data issued by the government.79 
It should be noted that the data is lik ely unreliable at the 
margins even if it accurately captures trends. For example, the 
government is not always forthright about either releases or 
76. WITTES & WYNE, supra note 72, at 5. 
77. Copies of all material relied on for this data are on file with the author and are 
available on request. See also methodological appendix. 
78. Transferred-The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes. 
com/guantanamo/detainees/transferred; Chisun Lee, Dig Into the Gitmo Detainee 
Lawsuits, PROPUBLICA, updated April 15, 2010, http://projects.propublica.org/ 
tables/gitmo-detainee-lawsuits. 
79. Data gathered by British journalist Andy Worthington was also consulted, but 
is not organized in a form that allows easy cross-reference. See Andy Worthington, 
Guantanamo: The Definitive Prisoner List, http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/ 
guantanamo-the-definitive-prisoner-list-part-1/. 
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sui ci des at the base.80 Hence, i t  i s  qui te possi ble that the data for 
the aggregate number of detai nees at the base i n  parti cular i s  
occasi onally off by a small margi n. Moreover, government 
statements concerni ng the release of detai nees do not i nclude 
the names of detai nees or the preci se dates of release, 
i ntroduci ng a source of possi ble error. 
c 
Consi der fi rst the i nteracti on between habeas and si mple 
physi cal li berty. To what extent does habeas have the effect of 
i ncreasi ng the wei ght assi gned to li berty i nterests as agai nst 
securi ty i nterests i n  a way that changes poli cy outcomes? Does 
habeas, i n  other words, both vi ndi cate li berty i nterests and also 
change the poli cy space avai lable to the Executi ve? 
One way of assessi ng habeas i s  to compare the pattern of 
releases before and after Boumediene. I thus begi n  by looki ng at 
the pattern of releases and detenti ons at Guantanamo i n  the 
larger context of 2002 to 2009. Fi gure 1 reports two stati sti cs: 
The total number of pri soners at Guantanamo and the total 
number of Guantanamo pri soners that had been released at a 
gi ven poi nt i n  ti me. Agai n, thi s  data i s  drawn from government 
press releases that are not evenly spaced temporally, but the 
graph has been modi fi ed so that each year occupi es an equal 
amount of space on the x-axi s. 
80. GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS, UPDATE TO THE CURRENT 
DETAINEE POPULATION OF GUANTANAMO: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 7 (2009) , http:// 
www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/1216_detainees_wittes/1216_detainees 
_ wittes_supplement. pdf 
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Figure 1: Trends in Detainee Population 
at Guantanamo ( 2002- 2009) 
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Because the data in Figure 1 are not immediately amenable 
to generaliz ation, it is worth look ing at the same data in 
annualiz ed form. Table 1 and Figure 2 report the net detainee 
population and th e cumulative number of detainees transferred 
or released at the end of each calendar year since 2002. Table 1 
reports changes in p opulation and aggregate transfers/releases 
by year, and break s  out the number transferred or released in a 
• 81 gi ven year. 
81. No annualized number of transfers and releases is reported from 2004 because 
it is not clear whether all the 202 reported released or transferred by the end of 2004 
were released in the calendar year of 2004. 
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Table 1 :  Guantanamo population changes , aggregate 
releas es /  trans fers , and annualiz ed releas es 
and trans fers ( 2002- 2009) 
Cumulative 
Number of 
Detainees Number 
Net Detainee Trans ferred trans ferred/ 
End of Population at or releas ed in year 
Year Guantanamo* Releas ed* to date 
2002 625 - -
2003 660 - -
2004 549 202 -
2005 500 256 54 
2006 395 380 124 
2007 275 500 120 
2008 250 520 120 
2009 198t 560 40 
403 
* Data comes from the final press release issued by the 
government in a calendar year; t reported by New York Times on 
January 11, 2010. No government number is available 
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Figure 2: Trends in Guantanamo population changes, 
aggregate releases/transfers, and annualiz ed releases and 
transfers ( 2002- 2009) 
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An additional set of data is useful in understanding the 
context of these trends. Guantanamo is not the sole internment 
facility used by the U.S.  government for detainees in terrorism­
related operations. The Bagram Theater Internment Facility, 
located just north of Kabul, Afghanistan, has been used for both 
individuals seiz ed in the Afghanistan-Pak istan conflict and also 
globally.82 Trends in aggregate detainee population at Bagram 
may be driven by two factors: developments in the regional 
conflict, and, to the extent the base provides a substitute for 
Guantanamo, governmental decisions to divert the flow of 
detainees from Cuba to Afghanistan. Data on the Bagram 
facility, however, is scarce. Figure 3 compiles the fragmentary 
data available from press and government sources concerning 
aggregate detention levels at Bagram. ( It should be noted that 
82. See Al-Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009) rev.d 605 F.3d 
84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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the x-axis on Figure 4 doe s  not re pre se nt time in a line ar 
fashion) . 
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Figure 3: Tre nds in De tainee Population at the 
Bagram The ate r  Inte rnme nt Facility ( 2002- 2009)83 
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Five thre shold obse rvations can be made about the se 
multiye ar data se ts. First, the aggre gate de te ntion population at 
Guantanamo pe ake d in 2003 and has bee n dropping e ve r  since . 
Ane cdotal information sugge sts that inflows to the base in fact 
large ly drie d up in 2004, afte r the Supre me Court's first 
inte rve ntions in the fie ld. The two large st transfe rs from the base 
re pre se nte d in Figure 1 do not occur at the e nd of the time 
pe riod, whe n  habe as jurisdiction was in e ffe ct, but at the 
be ginning. The y are in i) July and Nove mbe r 2003 ( re spe ctive ly 
27 and 20 transfe rs or re le ase s) ,  and ii) Se pte mbe r 2004 ( 46 
transfe rs or re le ase s). It is worth noting what was happe ning in 
the fe de ral courts at this time : The Supre me Court grante d the 
Rasul pe titione rs' re que st for ce rtiorari re vie w  on Nove mbe r  1 1 ,  
2003,84 and issue d  its Rasul opinion on  June 28, 2004.85 
83. Data in this chart is drawn from Alissa J. Rubin & Sangar Rahimi, In Shift, U.S. 
Military Names 645 Detainees Held at Key Afghanistan Base, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, 
at A6; Tim Golden, Foiling U.S. Plan, Prison Expands in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
7, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/07 /world/asia/07bagram.html; see also data 
reproduced at http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2008/0l/06/world/20080107 _ 
BAG RAM_ GRAPH.html. 
84. Rasul v. Bush, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003) (mem.) . 
85. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) . 
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Second, after those initial large transfers, transfer and 
release patterns settle into a stable pattern through mid-2008. 
Periodic releases of between ten and twenty detainees at one go 
punctuate a steady drip-feed of daily releases in the single digits. 
The burst of movement from 2003-04 is not repeated. Moreover, 
the annualiz ed number of releases remains stable. Indeed, given 
the extraordinarily low variance in net release rates from 2006 to 
2008, it is worth ask ing whether patterns of release in this period 
were determined by an internal government quota rather than 
by exogenous factors, such as information concerning detainees' 
status or the changing situation in countries of release. 
Third, even within the otherwise stable period of 2006-08, 
some details merit attention. For example, after the enactment 
of the DTA in December 2005, the rate of releases and transfers 
did not manifest a discernable decline. On the contrary, transfers 
and releases double between 2005 and 2006. There is also a 
distinct contrast between the first and second halves of 2007. In 
the first half of 2007, there were no days on which a double-digit 
transfer or release occurred. In the second half of 2007, by 
contrast, there were six separate double-digit transfers. In 
think ing about these trends, it is worth noting that the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari review in Boumediene on June 29, 2007. 
Of course, there is no clear evidence this correlation signals 
causation. An alternative explanation might point to internal 
administrative dynamics that are not available to an external 
observer, for example, around the iterative review processes 
made available after Rasul for detainees at the base. 
Fourth, the pattern of releases and transfers tails off 
dramatically in late 2008 and 2009. With one exception, there are 
no further days on which a double-digit number of detainees are 
transferred or released. Moreover, the total number of releases 
and transfers dropped by about 66.7% from a stable 2006-08 
level to a lower level in 2009. That is, just as the number of days 
on which significant numbers of releases and transfers declined, 
the overall number of release and transfers also declined after 
three years of stability. The decline in transfers and releases 
corresponds to the period in which habeas was available under 
Boumediene. It also includes the period in which President 
Obama entered office and assumed control and direction of 
detainee policy. 
Finally, aggregate detention levels at Bagram have been on 
the rise since 2004. It is unclear whether this should be attributed 
to the changing dynamics of the Afghan conflict or to diversions 
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of trans fers that would otherwis e have gone to Guantanamo.86 
At a minimum, the trend line for Bagram rais es the poss ibility 
that increas ed judicial s crutiny of Guantanamo res ults not in less 
detention, but rather detention in a different location. 
The 2002-2009 timeframe is not the only lens through which 
to examine the effects of habeas .  The effects of habeas might 
als o be vis ible in the time it has been available s ince 
Boumediene. Figure 4 pres ents data from that timeframe. The 
firs t data point, from December 2008, is for the firs t s et of 
releas es of detainees who prevailed in the dis trict court. It is 
hence a portrait of how habeas as a releas e  mechanis m  has 
coexis ted with whatever clearance and releas e  mechanis ms exis t 
within the Executive. 
Figure 4 s hows two s ets of data: Firs t, it illus trates "habeas 
releas es ," i .e . ,  releas es of detainees who had prevailed in a 
dis trict court habeas action, from Augus t  2008 to December 
2009. Second, it regis ters the "non-habeas releas es " during the 
s ame period: releas es of detainees who did not have a final 
judgment in a dis trict court habeas action.87 This data derives 
from the non-governmental s ources noted above, and als o 
government s tatements on releas es .  Every care has been tak en 
not to double count, although the incomplete form of 
government s tatements about releas es mak es this a challenge. 
86. Data about the locus of capture for Bagram detainees broken down by time 
would be illuminating. 
87. I have identified no case in which a detainee whose petition for habeas relief 
has been denied has been released. "Non-habeas releases" includes releases of persons in 
the absence of a final remedial order. Given the limited kinds of data available, however, 
it has been determined how many of the non-habeas releases are individuals with 
pending habeas petitions (or at what stage their petitions are) . This data was generated 
by cross-referencing government statements about releases with information about 
habeas litigation generated by the New York Times and others. 
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Fi gure 4: Trends i n  Releases After Favorable Habeas Judgment 
( "Habeas Releases") and In The Absence of Judi ci al Decree 
( "Non-Habeas Releases") ( December 2008- December 2009) 
Habeas v. Non-Habeas Releases (2008-09) 
14 
12 
10 • 
8 
We mi ght draw the followi ng i nferences from Fi gure 4 and 
underlyi ng data. Fi rst, duri ng the peri od i n  whi ch habeas was 
avai lable and the di stri ct courts were exerci si ng juri sdi cti on 
pursuant to Boumediene, a total of 52 detai nees were released. 
Second, from that total, 31 were what I have called "non-habeas 
releases." In the same ti me peri od, there were 21 releases of 
detai nees who had prevai led already i n  habeas acti ons i n  the 
di stri ct court. Otherwi se stated, 60% of those released i n  thi s  
peri od were "non-habeas releases," and 40% were "habeas 
releases."  We can also roughly calculate the proporti on of total 
releases that have followed as a result of habeas. As of 
December 9, 2009, 560 detai nees had been released or 
transferred from the Cuban base. Of that total, 3 .75 % were 
transferred subsequent to a fi nal judi ci al order of release. 
Another perspecti ve on the effect of habeas juri sdi cti on i s  
obtai ned by excludi ng non-habeas releases. In the peri od 
analyz ed, there were 32 cases i n  whi ch a di stri ct court had 
adjudi cated a habeas peti ti on to completi on and granted the 
peti ti on on the ground that the government lack ed legal 
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authority to hold the person. In the same period of time, there 
were nine petitions for habeas relief denied. In total, there were 
41 cases litigated to final judgment in the district court during 
this period. Within that set of cases, therefore, the habeas 
petitioner prevailed 78 percent of the time at the district-court 
level. To give some context to that number, compare it to the 
rate at which habeas is granted to petitioners convicted in state 
court and invok ing federal court jurisdiction under 28 
U .S.C.§ 2254. The comparison, of course, is not one of lik e to 
lik e. State habeas petitioners have benefited from access to a 
court of record, while Guantanamo detainees have access only to 
internal administrative procedures. Some might argue that the 
more appropriate comparison is to federal court habeas release 
of state pre-trial bail and dismissal decisions. But the 
government has always insisted that the Guantanamo detainees 
are in effect seek ing collateral review of the primary sorting 
mechanism for mak ing military detention decisions, which is 
internal to the military. Consider then that a 2007 study of § 2254 
habeas found that of 2384 noncapital habeas cases, only eight 
resulted in a grant of habeas relief, and one was reversed on 
appeal.88 In that post-conviction context, district courts thus 
grant relief 0.3 % of the time. 
· 
We see habeas 's effect in another light by look ing at the 
relationship of formal victory in a habeas action in the district 
court to the fact of physical release. Of the 32 cases in which a 
petitioner prevails, 21 have been followed by transfers or 
releases. That is, in 65 .6 percent of cases in which a habeas 
petition is victorious at the district court in a habeas action, 
victory translates into physical release. It is worth noting that 
number does not include any cases in which the government 
chose to appeal a loss in the district court. That is, the rate of 
releases represents not just releases but cases where the 
government has chosen to forego appeals. Since past releases 
cannot be judicially undone on appeals , the percentage of 
releases as a fraction of the total number of cases has a floor. 
Table 2 provides another perspective on this data. It 
summariz es habeas litigation by showing the percentage of cases 
in which a district court has reached a final adjudication and 
88. NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN 
U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY 
STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY 
ACT OF 1996 at 1 (2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/219558.pdf. 
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decided in favor of the detainee. It also shows the number of 
cases in which the district court has decided in favor of the 
government. Note that the table does not contain data on 
appeals. By definition, proceedings in which a detainee has been 
released have not been appealed. But in those cases in which an 
underlying detention persists, it of course remains open to a 
party to seek appellate correction. 
Table 2: District Court Habeas Litigation 
( August 2008- December 2009) 
As a Percentage of 
all Habeas Cases 
Number Decided 
Habeas Petitions 
Adjudicated ( as of 41 100 % 
December 31 ,  2009) 
Habeas Petitions Decided 
by a District Court in 
favor of the habeas 32 78% 
petitioner ( as of 
December 31 ,  2009) 
Number of 'meritorious' 
cases in which relief 21 51 % 
follows 
Number of ' meritorious' 
cases in which petitioner 1 1  27% 
remains detained89 
Again, this data shows that the rate at which district courts 
are granting the writ is far higher than in the postconviction 
context. But there is an imperfect correlation between a district 
court decision to grant the writ and a subsequent release order. 
This empirical snapshot of detention policy at Guantanamo 
that has been reviewed in this section reveals a surprisingly 
complex picture. After Boumediene, releases in the absence of a 
final judgment from a habeas corpus continue to dominate over 
89. About half of these are Uighur detainees whose situation the Supreme Court is 
slated to consider in the first half of 2010. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009), vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 1235 
(2010), aff'd on remand, 605 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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releas es in the wak e  of a dis trict court remedial order. Non­
habeas releas es compris e a majority ( 60 percent) of total 
releas es in the 2008-09 period. Yet the rate of detainee s uccess in 
habeas actions has ,  at leas t  through the end of 2009, been 
s urpris ingly high, at leas t  in comparis on to §2254 habeas .  Within 
the pool of s uccess ful habeas petitioners in the dis trict court, a 
majority of almos t two-third obtain releas e  without the 
protracted process of an appeal. If a petitioner litigated a cas e to 
conclus ion in the dis trict court, they were very lik ely to prevail, 
and if they prevailed they were lik ely to have s ecured releas e. 
Thus , although habeas may not have dominated as a modality of 
releas e  either from 2002 to 2009, or from late 2008 to 2009, 
where it was us ed, releas e  without the government's invocation 
of the appellate process followed in a s urpris ing proportion of 
cas es .  Individual phys ical liberty may not be directly vindicated 
by habeas in the aggregate, but the connection between habeas 
and individual liberty in that narrow s lice of cas es s eems robus t. 
D 
To ass ess whether habeas plays the two functions as cribed 
to it by Jus tice Kennedy's majority Boumediene opinion, it is 
als o necess ary to ask whether "fundamental political" liberty90 
has been vindicated or confirmed s ince June 2009. As defined by 
Jus tice Kennedy, this rather elus ive concept apparently obtains 
when citiz ens k now that each branch of the federal government, 
and in particular the Executive, operates only within a domain 
defined and bounded by legal limits . "Fundamental political" 
liberty, that is , is promoted by legal clarity and the ous ting of 
ambiguity. Thus , we mus t ask whether Boumediene eliminated 
legal ambiguity about the outer bounds of detention authority. 
Three principal data points inform this inquiry: the Supreme 
Court's Boumediene opinion; the government's s ubs equent legal 
pos itions; and the Dis trict of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ' 
January 5, 2010 judgment in Al-Bihani v. Obama,91 which ess ays 
a more extended expos ition of detention authority. The latter 
repres ents , at leas t  at the time of this writing, the dis pos itive 
legal rule concerning the s cope of government detention power 
at Guantanamo. Together, Boumediene, the government's legal 
res pons e ,  and Al-Bihani do little or nothing to promote the 
90. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
91. 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010) . 
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"fundamental" political liberty celebrated in Justice Kennedy's 
opinions. To the contrary, the evidence reveals a gap between 
Boumediene's aspirations and its effects on black -letter doctrine. 
Consider first the legal consequences of Boumediene. In his 
majority opinion, Justice Kennedy characteriz ed the judicial 
function in habeas as one of conducting "a meaningful review of 
both the cause for detention and the Executive's power to 
detain. "92 That authority derives centrally from the 2001 
Authoriz ation for the Use of Military Force ( "AUMF") .93 Even 
though the Court had previously indicated it would flesh out the 
contours of that authority,94 Boumediene provided no 
supplemental guidance as to the metes and bounds of 
permissible detention authority. Instead, the Court obliquelefs 
cast doubt on another aspect of the plurality opinion in Hamdi. 5 
The net result of Boumediene, therefore, was to leave the 
substantive law of executive detention incrementally murk ier 
than before. While doctrinal ambiguity is often one outcome of 
Supreme Court review, it is at least peculiar that an opinion 
justified as a means to promote legal certainty would leave so 
much for subsequent resolution through an inevitably 
fragmented process of district court adjudication and appellate 
clarification. Boumediene, that is, can be criticiz ed for failing to 
promote the legal clarity that was one of its central normative 
premises. It was, on one view, an exercise in legality without law. 
Second, Boumediene did not prompt any substantial change 
in the Executive's legal position. But in the wak e  of both 
Boumediene and the subsequent shift from Bush to Obama, the 
government bifurcated its definition of detention authority. It 
now seems to apply one definition in litigation and another in 
internal deliberations. This can only undermine the clarity of 
boundaries on executive detention power. 
Understanding this development demands a comparison of 
government legal positions before and after Boumediene. During 
the Bush Administration, the government applied a unitary 
92. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269 (2008). 
93. Pub. L. . No. 107-40, 1 15 Stat. 224 (2001). The Executive might also claim 
separate authority under Article II of the Constitution. 
94. In Hamdi, the plurality opinion declined to define the scope of detention power 
beyond the facts at hand, but left the matter open for subsequent adjudication. Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004) (plurality op.) ("The permissible bounds of the 
category will be defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases are presented to 
them."). 
95. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2269 (pointedly observing that the plurality in 
Hamdi "did not garner a majority of the Court"). 
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understanding of AUMF-related detention authority. In federal 
court, the Justice Department in 2008 invok ed the definition of 
"enemy combatant" that had been applied in military status 
hearings. The latter would have permitted the detention of any 
"individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida 
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners [including] ... any 
person who has committed a. belligerent act or has directly 
supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces."96 
The Obama Administration, however, has seemingly 
developed a bifurcated approach to detention authority- a legal 
definition and a less stringent set of functional criteria for 
mak ing release decisions. It thus appears to have one definition 
of detention authority for internal deliberations and a separate 
one for litigation. In the post-Boumediene habeas litigation, the 
Holder Justice Department has offered a new definition of 
detention authority under the A UMF that encompasses 
persons that the President determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11,  2001 , . . . persons who harbored those 
responsible for those attacks[, or] . . . who were part of, or 
substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or 
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the 
United States or its coalition partners, including any person 
who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly supported 
hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces. "97 
This definition appears to differ in one k ey regard from the Bush 
definition: While the Bush definition allowed detention of a 
person who "supported" al-Qaeda or the Taliban, the Obama 
definition requires "substantia[l] support." How much difference 
that distinction creates is still uncertain. It is telling, though, that 
research has revealed no habeas proceeding in which the Obama 
Administration has reversed course by declaring that a detainee 
previously thought to fall under AUMF detention authority does 
not in fact do so.98 So far, the operative value of the legal change 
appears de minim us. 
96. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals (CSRTs) Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 
7, 2004)). 
97. Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Respondents' 
Revised Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority Relation to 
Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 3). 
98. As explained below, taskforce decisions to release detainees do not show a 
change in legal position because the taskforce is not applying a legal definition of 
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By contrast, the Obama Administration appears to apply a 
wholly different calculus in internal deliberations about 
detentions. In directing an interagency task force to assess 
Guantanamo detentions,99 President Obama did not require the 
task force to determine whether detentions were lawful under the 
AUMF. Rather, he ordered new determinations whether 
"continued detention is in the national security and foreign 
policy interests of the United States. "100 In January 2010, the 
director of the interagency task force, Matthew Olsen, confirmed 
that forward-look ing risk assessments, not back ward-look ing 
judgments of legality, guide release decisions. In an interview 
with the BBC, Olsen explained that the task force ask s  whether a 
"person [can] be safely transferred out of the United States," 
and not whether the detainee fits within the AUMF's contours. 101 
The interaction between the legal floor and the seemingly 
discretionary functional standard for release is unclear. 
The pattern of subsequent releases confirms the application 
of this forward-look ing standard. The Administration has made 
categorical determinations against release based on risk rather 
than legality. In the wak e  of the December 2009 attempt to 
down a Detroit-bound airplane, for example, the Administration 
ceased detainee transfers to Yemen based on concerns about the 
southern Arabian nation's ability to handle returnees102 or "to 
implement adequate mitigation measures to address any threat 
the detainee may pose. "103 The net result is a policy on detention 
in which wholly different standards are invok ed in internal 
deliberations and in federal court litigation. Whether the 
bifurcation can be attributed to Boumediene or the change in 
administrations, it is hard to see the post-Boumediene situation 
as a return to clear, consistently applied constraints on executive 
detention authority. 
detention authority. 
99. The taskforce is discussed in more detail below. See infra at III.A. 
100. Exec. Order No. 13492 § 2(d) , 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 22, 2009) . 
101. Jon Manel, The Man Who Decides the Fate of Guantanamo Detainees, BBC 
NEWS, Jan. 17, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/americas/8454351.stm. 
102. See Steve Holland, U.S. Suspends Guantanamo Prison Transfer to Yemen, 
REUTERS (Wash. D.C.) , Jan. 5, 2010. This was not an insight by the Obama 
Administration. Through 2008, U.S. government officials expressed concern about the 
Yemeni government's capacity to repatriate detainees without undermining that 
country's fragile stability. See Dan Eggen & Josh White, Debate over Guantanamo's Fate 
Intensifies, WASH. POST, July 4, 2008, at Al. 
103. Manel, supra note 101 (quoting Matthew Olsen) . 
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A further data point for assessing Boumediene's 
consequences for "fundamental political" liberty is the D.C. 
Circuit's January 5, 2010, opinion in Al-Bihani v. Obama, 104 in 
which the court of appeals first set forth its views on the scope of 
detention authority under the AUMF. The Al-Bihani Court 
drew on language in the 2006 Military Commissions Act and its 
2009 amendments to hold that detention authority included 
those who "purposefully and materially supported hostilities 
against the United States or its coalition partners,"  and to reject 
arguments offered by both the habeas petitioner and the 
government that the laws of war bounded detention authority.105 
That is, the court of appeals looked to later-enacted statutes to 
give substance to the ambiguous terms of the 2001 AUMF. 
Al-Bihani resolves some of the ambiguities left open by 
Boumediene but its approach to statutory interpretation 
undermines the promotion of "fundamental political" liberty. At 
a threshold matter, there may be little space between the Court's 
"purposefully and materially support[ing] " standard and the 
government's substantial support standard. Faced with what at 
best can be characterized as meaningful statutory ambiguity and 
a range of possible interpretive strategies, the court in effect 
adopted one almost wholly favorable to the government's claim 
of detention authority. Al-Bihani then is clearly not 
characterized by the concerns about limiting government 
expressed by the Supreme Court in Boumediene. But this is 
simply to say that the government won, which may not be 
especially telling. 
More significantly, the Court of Appeals' methodological 
approach to statutory interpretation belies the Boumediene 
Court's account of the federal courts as a check on government. 
Rather than looking to the canonical sources of statutory 
interpretation, such as text, enactment context, or legislative 
history, the D.C. Circuit looked to a pair of statutes enacted in 
2006 and 2009. It used these later-enacted statutes to determine 
whether the petitioner's 2002 detention under a 2001 statute was 
104. 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The D.C. Circuit has elaborated Al-Bihani in 
several further cases. See Bensayah v. Obama, No. 08-5537, 2010 WL 2640626 (D.C. Cir. 
June 28, 2010); Barhoumi v. Obama, No. 09-5383, 2010 WL 2553540 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 
2010); Awad v. Obama, No. 09-5351 ,  2010 WL 2292400 (D.C. Cir. June 2, 2010). 
105. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872 (quoting Military Commission Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 1 18-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2190, 2575-76 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 MCA]); see also 
id. at 883 (Williams, J. ,  concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (observing 
that "the laws of war have- even in the government's view- a  role to play in the 
interpretation of the AUMF's grant of authority"). 
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lawful. The Court of Appeals thus looked to legislative action 
four years into the habeas petitioner's ongoing detention to 
determine the lawfulness of that detention. To be sure, courts do 
on occasion look to later-enacted statute to give meaning to an 
earlier legislative provision. But this is rare. On one recent and 
controversial occasion, the Supreme Court stated that "the 
meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, 
particularly where Congress has s�oken subsequently and more 
specifically to the topic at hand." 1 6 But it did so in a case where 
Congress has expressly considered the legal question at issue and 
where later-enacted legislation logically conflicted with one 
possible interpretation of the earlier statute. Neither of these 
conditions obtain in Al-Bihani. Rather, the later-enacted statute 
concerns a different subject matter, and the logical nexus is not 
11 . 107 compe mg. 
More significantly, the Circuit Court's decision to gauge 
detention authority in relation to later-enacted statutes is 
inconsistent with a goal of promoting "fundamental political" 
liberty by the elimination of ambiguities in the law and the 
imposition of clear constraints on government authority. If 
ongoing detentions can be defended by a detention power that is 
redefined by statute four years into the detention, there is little 
to prevent an amendment of the law so as to justify post hoc 
propter hoc detentions that otherwise would be illegal. The 
Executive can detain and then craft requests for detention 
authority around what it knows about its captives. The 
constraining effect of legality dissolves. Rather than boosting 
legal predictability and stability, the D.C. Circuit's approach 
106. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 529 U.S. 120, 133, 147-51 (2000). 
107. The Al-Bihani Court's assumption that the MCA's definitions, which apply to 
military tribunals, apply to detention too is questionable. See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 870. 
First, Congress addressed detention in the 2006 MCA, and yet choose not to define 
explicitly detention authority. Second, the MCA defines "unlawful enemy combatant" 
(which is a different term from "enemy combatant") for the purposes of military 
commission jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit assumed that detention was a lesser incident of 
the power to subject a person to military commission jurisdiction. It draws this greater­
includes-the-lesser assumption from international humanitarian law, which the opinion 
otherwise spurns. But the international law is based on a far narrower model of 
permissible military tribunal jurisdiction than that endorsed by the D.C. Circuit. The 
international law, as relevant here, "appear[s] to prohibit the prosecution of indirect 
participant and nonparticipant civilians before military tribunals with limited 
exceptions." Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 48, 59 (2009). It is unclear whether the greater-includes-the-lesser argument can 
be uprooted from its original context and applied to a very different baseline definition 
of commission authority. It is thus far from clear that the D.C. Circuit's opportunistic and 
selective borrowing of international law is principled or coherent. 
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invites post hoc political interference at odds with Justice 
Kennedy's predicate of "fundamental political" liberty. 
In sum, Boumediene's promissory note for more ample 
"fundamental political" liberty is still unredeemed. The Supreme 
Court's failure to define detention authority has opened the 
door to a new and confusing bifurcation of detention authority in 
the executive branch, and an ambitious and broad reading of 
detention authority by a court of appeals that leaves open ample 
possibility of post hoc manipulation by the political branches. 
III 
How do these policy and doctrinal developments illuminate 
the relationship between habeas, liberty, and the separation of 
powers? The data presented here cannot answer that 
definitively. They concern only one temporally bounded policy 
(post-9/1 1 executive detention) . Nor do the data allow for 
identification of causal effects .  One especially nettlesome 
problem of inference is that post-Boumediene habeas came on 
line at roughly the same time as a major political transition from 
President George W. Bush to President Barack H. Obama. 
This Part sets out a tentative account of the data. For the 
sake of clarity, I first address the most important potentially 
confounding variable -the concurrent political transition. I 
suggest there is scant reason to believe that the presidential 
transition dampened any libertarian effect from habeas. 
Returning to the data points explored in Part II, I tentatively 
advance some hypotheses and further inquiries about the 
constitutional role of habeas corpus. 
A 
The Supreme Court decided Boumediene in June 2008. But 
the first district court release orders were not issued until 
December 2008, little more than one month before President 
Obama's inauguration. With the exception of Judge Leon, 
moreover, the Justice Department was able to persuade all of 
the judges of the D.C. District Court to delay adjudication of 
habeas petitions until the new Administration came into office. 
Hence, the political architects of Guantanamo detention policy 
never had to explain their discrete detention decisions in federal 
court. Habeas's effects on release rates, if they exist, are 
comingled with and confounded by the effects of that political 
transition. 
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The change from a Republican to a Democratic 
Administration might be expected to correlate with an increased 
emphasis on libertarian over security values. Polling data 
gathered by the Pew Research Center from 2001 to 2007 reveals 
a "deep divide" on national security issues between Republicans 
and Democrats , with a 20 percentage point difference in their 
willingness to eliminate civil liberties. 108 So more releases in the 
absence of judicial direction, therefore, might be expected under 
President Obama than President Bush simply by dint of the 
constituencies responsible for the former's electoral victory. This 
in tum might be expected to dilute the libertarian effect of 
habeas as petitioners who would otherwise obtain judicial relief 
are preemptively released by the Administration. 
But this hypothesis is not borne out by the facts. The effect 
of the change in Administration on security policy more 
generally has been ambiguous. Some commentators find little 
practical difference.109 The new Administration also has reasons 
to move more slowly than its supporters might wish. While left­
libertarian members of the Administration may view the volume 
of Guantanamo detentions as excessive, the new President may 
be unwilling to antagonize the security agencies, such as the 
CIA. Presumably, it is difficult to secure desired policy 
cooperation without buy-in from a substantial part of that 
agency's leadership and senior personnel.110 Worse for left­
libertarians, release of detainees during a Democratic 
Administration is more politically costly than release under 
Bush. Whereas few on either left or right attacked the Bush 
White House for excessive leniency on its release policy, 
President Obama expected and received assaults from the right 
on the issue.111 At the margin then, each release is more costly at 
the polls for Obama than for Bush. 
108. Obviously, Republicans tend to be more pro-security. See Darshan Goux, 
Patrick Egan & Jack Citrin, The War on Terror and Civil Liberties, in PUBLIC OPINION 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 322-25 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin, & Patrick 
J. Egan, eds. 2008). 
109. See Peter Baker, Obama's War over Terror, N.Y. TIMES MAG. , Jan. 17, 2010, at 
30 (quoting James Carafano as saying about Obama's approach to national security: "I 
don't think it's even fair to call it Bush lite . . . .  It's Bush. It's really, really hard to find a 
difference that's meaningful and not atmospheric."). 
1 10. President Obama's resistance to left-of-center calls for investigation and 
prosecution of detainee abuse may best be understand as an effort to keep security 
agencies on-side. In general, the degree to which subordinate agencies impose a 
constraint on decision-making by the White House is a topic that has not received 
sufficient attention in the national security literature. 
1 1 1. See, e. g., Obama Responds to Cheney's Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009, at 
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As I noted in Part II, the Obama White House crafted a 
mechanism for detention policy-making to reflect this political 
pressure: Delegating the hard decisions to someone else who 
would take the political heat.112 Two days after his inauguration, 
on January 22, 2009, President Obama established an 
interagency taskforce to "undertake a prompt and thorough 
review of the factual and legal bases" for detentions at 
Guantanamo. 1 13 Styled as a body of neutral, but largely military, 
expertise,114 the taskforce provided the Obama Administration 
with an argument that releases would be the product of 
professional deliberation and calculus rather than first-order 
liberal political preferences. Reliance on the taskforce 
mechanism meant delays in releases, while the taskforce was 
assembled and began its work of assembling dossiers on the 
detainees.115 The taskforce also became a source of delay in the 
litigation, where the government argued that any discovery 
access to files created by the taskforce about given detainees 
would delay individual habeas proceedings by weeks or 
months.116 The effect of delay was to disperse a set of hard 
decisions across an uncertain period of time, making it more 
difficult for the Administration's political opponents to mobilize 
against it. Looking at the taskforce mechanism, it might thus be 
expected that the release rate for Guantanamo would drop 
immediately after the January 2009 inauguration, as indeed 
seems to have been the case. On this account, internal political 
change would not be a substitute for the libertarian effects of 
habeas. 
Al 7 (summarizing criticisms by former Vice President Richard Cheney). 
1 12. It is well known that delegation is a way for legislators to evade hard choices 
while reaping the benefits of a decision. See MICHAEL T. HA YES, LOBBYISTS AND 
LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS 93-94 (1981). I am simply pointing 
out how the president can benefit from a similar tactic. 
1 13. Exec. Order No. 13,492 § 2(d), 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
1 14. See id. at §4(b) (listing principals, including the Attorney General, the Secretary 
of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of 
National Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and also 
emphasizing the inclusion of "employees with intelligence, counterterrorism, military, 
and legal experience"). Military expertise dominates numerically over legal expertise, 
although the taskforce's director is a career Department of Justice attorney with special 
expertise in national security. 
1 15. See Obama Task Force Determine Fate of Terror Detainees, AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, Feb. 20, 2009. 
1 16. See In re Guantanamo Bay Litig., Mem. Of Points & Auths. in Support of 
Resp's' Motion for Reconsideration of Orders Regarding Discovery from Guantanamo 
Review Task Force & Motion Consolidating Order Regarding Task Force Discovery, 
Misc No. 98-442 (TFH), dkt no. 553-2, May 12, 2009, at 2, 13 (on file with author) 
(predicting delays of between four and twelve months). 
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In the litigation trenches, moreover, government strategy 
has been characterized by stability rather than change. Recall 
that Justice Department litigation strategy between 2002 and 
2009 in the habeas cases focused on jurisdictional issues. Its net 
effect was to deny or at least defer judicial consideration of the 
merits in habeas cases. Under Obama's direction, one might 
initially expect, government lawyers may be less inclined to seek 
appellate review or otherwise delay a release. More cases might 
go forward and more releases might result. An unsystematic 
review of a sample of government papers via Westlaw, however, 
suggests that the personnel litigating the Guantanamo cases have 
not changed significantly. Even if the Obama Administration 
wished to change the way that the Guantanamo cases were 
litigated, moreover, it would be a complex matter to obtain the 
personnel changes across two departments to achieve this end. 
Finally, "it takes time for presidents to staff the administrative 
state,"117 with higher offices attended to before line positions.118 It 
is thus plausible to expect that government litigation strategy 
would not change significantly with the Bush-Obama transition 
because of the difficulties confronting all new presidents in 
reorienting policy and the tendency to do so from the top down. 
In sum, the effect of transition from the Bush White House 
to an Obama Administration on detainee policy is far from 
predictable. On the contrary, it is highly ambiguous. But perhaps 
the most plausible expectation is that the political transition 
would lead to a dip in aggregate release rates as the taskforce 
came on line, but that the government's litigation strategy would 
likely remain constant.119 Against this backdrop, there is little 
reason to expect that the libertarian effects of habeas would be 
diluted against the larger backdrop of regime change. 
1 17. Anne Joseph O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency 
Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 918 (2009). 
118 .  ANNE JOSEPH O'CONNELL, LET'S GET IT STARTED: WHAT PRESIDENT-ELECT 
OBAMA CAN LEARN FROM PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS IN MAKING POLITICAL 
APPOINTMENTS 1-2 (2009), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/01/pdf/ 
presidential_appoin tments. pdf. 
1 19. Conversations with habeas counsel suggest that this is so. Counsel with whom I 
spoke pointed to government litigation strategy over attorney access, the discovery of 
exculpatory materials, and the timing of both returns and mandated disclosures as 
evidence that the government continued to pursue a strategy of deferment or limitation. 
The question whether government litigation strategies change with shifts in an 
Administration's political orientation is a complex one and merits a more systematic 
treatment than this. 
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B 
Even once the political change in the White House is 
accounted for, the data presented in Section II still pose a 
complex interpretive challenge. Even setting aside problems 
with data released by the government, changes in detention 
policy cannot be causally linked to activity in the courts without 
considerable hesitation. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some 
general conclusions, and to attempt some more granular 
speculation about the likely influence of habeas upon policy. 
One central finding stands out: While the data is in many 
respects ambiguous, it strongly suggests that the effect of 
Boumediene on detention policy was not significant. It is striking 
that at the most, less than four percent of releases from the 
Cuban base have followed a judicial order of release - and even 
in these case it is not wholly clear that release would not have 
happened sooner or later. Moreover, the annualized number of 
releases drops after Boumediene. Even in those few cases in 
which the habeas writ has been granted, nagging questions 
persist about the scope and effective force of the federal court's 
remedial authority. Courts to date (with a few exceptions) have 
been reluctant to direct outright release, and have instead issued 
delicately phrased pleas to "try harder" to the Executive 
(although in more than two dozen cases, the data in Table 2 
show, the Executive heeds this plea) . From a distance, therefore, 
habeas seems far from an effective tool for checking executive 
authority. The ambitious claims made in the literature for and 
against Boumediene are thus misguided. 
Further, there is no positive relationship between the 
doctrinal consequences of Boumediene and its progeny on the 
one hand, and the "fundamental political" liberty celebrated by 
Justice Kennedy. The black-letter law of detention, and the 
implementation of that law by the government, is no clearer, no 
more stable, and no more coherent than it was before 
Boumediene. The latter case cast some doubt on the guiding 
force of Hamdi, while the D.C. Circuit's Al-Bihani decision blew 
past Hamdi in its haste to embrace legislative language from 
2006 and 2009. The Al-Bihani Court's methodology invites post 
hoc gerrymandering of detention policy by Congress. The net 
result is bleak on either one of Boumediene's metrics: Habeas is 
not central to the protection of physical liberty, at least in the 
experience of the Guantanamo detainees. And "fundamental 
political" liberty, to the extent that it is deepened by judicial 
confirmation of clear bounds to executive authority, has been 
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disserved, if not wholly displaced, by the combination of 
Boumediene's fecklessness and Al-Bihani's invitation to 
mischief. Federal courts, it seems, are too hesitant and 
circumspect in their approach to executive detention decisions to 
vindicate "fundamental political" liberty via the elaboration of 
black-letter rules. The data, on this reading, should be little 
comfort for those who claim to value the separation of power. 
Neither part of Boumediene's justifying logic, in other words, has 
yielded much by way of practical result. Its consequences are on 
the one hand doctrinal ambiguity and on the other practically 
uncertainty. 
But this is not to say that the federal courts' exercise of 
habeas jurisdiction has had no effect upon the executive policy 
space. To observe an absence of large, direct effects from habeas 
is not to rule out the possibility of smaller, indirect effects. 
Habeas , that is, may serve liberty indirectly. Although the larger 
claims on behalf of habeas might be unwarranted, it is certainly 
possible, and even probable, that habeas has a meaningful 
incentive effect that can be traced in the data. To identify such 
an indirect effect entails situating the writ in a larger institutional 
context of the courts' interactions with other branches of 
government. The data presented here does not allow a detailed 
investigation of such indirect connections. But it is suggestive. In 
the balance of this paper, therefore, I sketch a tentative account 
of how federal court action both before and after Boumediene 
may have altered the Executive's options based on the limited 
data available. 
Start with the period before Boumediene, when the natural 
assumption would be that patterns of releases and detentions are 
unrelated to what goes on in the courts. But this assumption may 
be overstated. From the perspective of a rational Executive 
deciding on detention policy under uncertainty, the Supreme 
Court's rulings in Hamdi and Rasul might be viewed as warnings 
from the Court-call them shots across the bow-that the 
government's approach to detention policy lacked the indicia of 
professionalism and reliability that the Court searches for in 
granting the deference often evinced on national security and 
foreign affairs matters.120 As I have argued elsewhere,121 these 
120. For an argument that this was at work in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 
(2006), see Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to 
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 94-95. 
121. See Aziz Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 
225. 
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decisions catalyzed important structural changes to detainee 
policy within the government but skirted even the hint of 
individualized release. 
Between Rasul and Hamdi, the Court forced the Executive 
into a wholesale restructuring of detainee processing. Until those 
decisions, the government had done little by way of release. 2004 
is the first year in which a non-trivial number of releases can be 
observed. Until Rasul and Hamdi, moreover, military officials 
would have had little reason to institute a meaningful processing 
and release policy. It is highly unlikely that marginal fiscal 
effects have much motivating effects in this area. It is far from 
clear that bureaucrats in general are ever sensitive to marginal 
fiscal costs .122 And the idea that terrorism detention should be 
driven by fiscal concerns is implausible. On the other side of the 
ledger, individual releases are politically costly as admissions of 
error by the government. Even if the nation would be better off 
with a detention policy that appeared less lawless, institutional 
incentives might thus preclude development of such a policy. On 
this account, Rasul and Hamdi break an equilibrium 
characterized by an absence of releases by adding a new factor 
to officials ' calculations. In the wake of those decisions, officials 
had to account for the risk that courts would intervene directly, 
with potentially embarrassing consequences.123 
The observed pattern of releases, described in Figures 1 and 
2 above, is at least consistent with this account. There are spikes 
in release in November 2003, soon after the Supreme Court 
granted the Rasul petitioners' request for certiorari review,124 and 
in September 2004, two months after the Rasul opinion was 
issued.125 That is, increases in the rate of releases might 
correspond to judicial action raising the probability of intrusive 
judicial supervision. These correspondences, however, are at 
best rough: The time lag between judicial events and policy 
changes is between weeks and months. Confounding factors 
simply cannot be eliminated in either case. 
The data nonetheless allows the inference that Rasul and 
Hamdi had two important indirect effects: They triggered 
122. See Daryl Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the 
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 370-71 (2000). 
123. To the extent that officials are concerned about the power of their branch in the 
abstract, the prospect of more robust judicial interference may have costs beyond the 
reputational. 
124. Rasul v. Bush, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003) (mem.). 
125 . Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
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sunshine and generated a "support infrastructure" that imposed 
larger political and publicity costs for continued detentions. 
First, those decisions ratcheted up the number of Guantanamo 
detainees with lawyers. In 2004, the habeas litigation in the 
Supreme Court involved a mere fourteen individuals.126 By 2009, 
even after serial depletion of the detainee population, there have 
been more than 200 habeas actions filed. Many of the lawyers 
work for large commercial law firms, doing habeas pro bono. 
Several such firms, such as Venable LLP, Jenner & Block, 
WilmerHale, and Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, have close and 
continuing contacts with government.127 Some lawyers quit 
commercial practice to work full-time on habeas litigation. 
Coordinating this group, the Center for Constitutional Rights 
runs an email list-service for the several hundred lawyers, 
located across the country, who represent detainees. The net 
result of this activity was a "vibrant . . . support structure" 
distantly akin to ones observed in mid-twentieth century 
America prior to the civil rights revolution.128 At a minimum, 
Rasul and Hamdi opened the door to the growth of this support 
structure. More ambitiously, it is possible that the decisions had 
a legitimating effect on mobilization efforts in the private sphere 
on behalf of the detainees. 
Litigation leveraging this support structure meant lawyers 
visiting the Cuban base for the first time in 2004.129 It meant not 
merely greater litigation pressure on the government, but, more 
significantly, a much greater flow of potentially embarrassing 
information back to the United States. In some cases of 
obviously erroneous detention, the government chose release 
rather than protracted litigation that could detract from the 
larger portrait painted of Guantanamo as containing only highly 
dangerous detainees.130 Sunshine, that is, was one of the indirect 
results of the Rasul and Hamdi decisions that generated new 
costs for the government. 
Also consistent with this narrative is the parallel rise in 
detention operations at Bagram. The increasing use of Bagram 
126. Id. at 470. 
127. See generally THE GUANTANAMO LA WYERS: INSIDE A PRISON OUTSIDE THE 
LAW 31-32 (Mark P. Denbeaux & Jonathan Hafetz eds., 2009) (describing early stages of 
litigation). 
128. CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LA WYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND 
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 20-22 (1998). 
129. Denbeaux & Hafetz, supra note 127, at 55-56. 
130. See, e.g., MURAT KURNAZ, FIVE YEARS OF MY LIFE: AN INNOCENT MAN AT 
GUANTANAMO 18, 219-20 (2008). 
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for detainees captured as far afield as Dubai and Thailand131 is 
plausible evidence that Rasul and Hamdi prompted not only 
more robust internal procedures for detention operations, but 
also jurisdictional circumvention. Just as the initial choice of 
Guantanamo was driven by a concern to minimize "litigation 
risk," so after Rasul and Hamdi it was predictable that officials 
would look for new ways of reducing the costs of judicial 
supervision. Hence the flight to Bagram. Today, the prospect of 
increased judicial supervision of Bagram may well precipitate a 
flight to more durable redoubts from federal court 
superintendence. The recent U.S. decision to hand Ba gram over 
to Afghan authorities, which in effect raises a possible new 
jurisdictional hurdle to ongoing habeas litigation, corroborates 
this.132 
The Executive's response to Boumediene provides further 
evidence of the judiciary's indirect influence on detention policy. 
On April 2, 2007, the Supreme Court initially denied certiorari in 
Boumediene. The Court's decision on June 29, 2007, to reverse 
course by granting a petition for rehearing in Boumediene was a 
surprise, and so provided new information about the Court's 
intentions.133 Petitions for rehearing are rarely granted by the 
Supreme Court. A Bayesian Executive would treat the grant of 
certiorari in Boumediene as telling evidence that closer judicial 
scrutiny was forthcoming. The data in Figures 1 and 2 for the six­
month period from June 2007 onward show a higher rate of 
release correlated with the Boumediene certiorari grant. Again, 
this is some evidence of an indirect effect from habeas 
jurisdiction. Moreover, the idea that the Court responds to 
signals of professionalization (or the lack thereof) gains 
credibility from the manner of the Court's decision to grant 
certiorari in Boumediene. As Daniel Meltzer has persuasively 
argued, that volte-face is best understood in light of disclosures 
by former military officers alleging that the military's internal 
process used to sort detainees was rigged to generate outcomes 
sought by the government.134 Jurisdiction is thus the progeny of 
judicial distrust. 
131. See Al-Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009) rev'd 605 F.3d 
89 (D.C. Cir. 2010) . 
132. See Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Readies New Facility for Afghan Detainees, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009, at AS. 
133. Boumediene v. Bush, 551 U.S. 1161 (2007) (mem.) . 
134. Meltzer, supra note 57, at 47-50. It may be more accurate to say that the 
traditional deference owed the military was ousted by evidence of political influence. 
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Now consider the policy landscape in the wake of 
Boumediene. By the end of 2008, the effect of hundreds of 
releases had been to increase the concentration of detainees with 
allegedly more substantial ties to terrorism, and to dilute the 
number of detainees with only weak connections to al-Qaeda or 
the Taliban. A lion's share of easy cases have thus been resolved. 
The liberatory effects of sunshine and litigation infrastructure 
were equally subject to diminishing returns. Moreover, the shift 
from the Bush to Obama presidencies may have undermined the 
political value of disclosure, which went for detainees' advocates 
from being a convenient way of embarrassing a disliked 
government to a delicate question to be negotiated with a 
presumptively favorable Administration.135 Remaining cases 
often presented difficulties because of foreign policy 
complications attendant on release.136 Others, including the 
authors of many Yemenis, raised security concerns related to 
conditions in their country of release. (Indeed, as of September 
2009, a third of the 78 detainees cleared for transfer were 
Yemeni, while 13 were Chinese Uighurs, whose release was 
opposed by the Chinese government.)137 That is, by the time of 
Boumediene, the odds were that habeas would be too little, too 
late, as a remedy to unlawful detention. 
Despite these obstacles, the small minority of detainees who 
have pressed habeas actions not only proceed to final judgment 
but tend to obtain a favorable outcome of release. How might 
this assuredly incremental effect be explained? One hypothesis 
would be that releases following habeas actions are substitutes 
for, rather than complements to, releases in the absence of 
habeas jurisdiction. That is, even the figure of 3 .75 % releases by 
habeas is an overstatement. Net releases would, in fact, not 
135. It is further worth observing (somewhat loosely) that President Obama's 
election, and his public decision to close Guantanamo, deflated a political alliance 
between left-liberal activists and a large segment of the public and foreign policy elite 
that had disliked the effect Guantanamo had on foreign relations. Through his January 
22, 2009, announcement and his June 4, 2009, Cairo speech, the new President in effect 
razed the political coalition that had built up during the Bush years without changing 
much by way of policy. Obama's corrosive effect on the left-liberal reforming coalition 
may have been the most important national-security related change accomplished in 
January 2009. In the new light of the Obama presidency, disclosures of new abuse or 
arguments about the injustice at continuing detention had to overcome a cognitive 
dissonance in their audience. 
136. This seems to be the case for the ethnic Uighurs, who are petitioners in the 
Kiyemba case in the U.S. Supreme Court. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009), vacated and remanded, 130 S .  Ct. 1235 
(2010) aff'd on remand 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
137. See Governance Studies at Brookings, supra note 80, at 12. 
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differ with or without habeas. To be sure, the thesis of habeas as 
complete substitute rather than as complement cannot be ruled 
out. But it seems unlikely to explain all the releases .  First, in 
habeas litigation, the government routinely expends 
considerable time, personnel, and even credibility with the 
federal bench arguing that individuals should be detained. There 
is no reason to take this effort by the federal government at 
anything other than face value. Second, and more powerfully, 
the evidence suggests that when the federal government decides 
to release a detainee who has a pending habeas action, it does so 
without continuing to contest the habeas action by appeals.138 
Given that the government abandons defense of habeas actions 
when it determines a detainee should be released, there is no 
reason to believe that its representations in otherwise contested 
actions are anything other than sincere. It may be that a district 
court loss truly conveys new information to the government. In 
short, attributing 3.75 % of releases to habeas may be an 
overestimation, but it is also unlikely that the proper estimate is 
zero. Habeas, in short, has some effect in the cases in which a 
court reaches a final judgment. 
With respect to those habeas actions that do prevail, it is 
plausible to posit that habeas counsel with stronger cases have 
tended to push more aggressively in court, rather than hoping to 
negotiate a favorable outcome with the government. The first 
wave of habeas litigation in the district court thus likely selected 
for strong cases in favor of release. In these cases, the district 
court can dissolve a log-jam at the individual detainee level, just 
as the Hamdi and Rasul judgments nudged the Executive into 
more wholesale reconsideration of detainee processing. Judicial 
action in these cases is evidence of a direct libertarian effect 
from habeas. But that direct effect is numerically far less 
important than the indirect effects of habeas jurisdiction being 
confirmed in Rasul and Hamdi. That is, the bulk of releases 
(from 2004-08) have taken place against the "shadow" of habeas 
jurisdiction. 
In this light, there is a strong analogy between habeas 
litigation and theories of criminal procedure that emphasize the 
indirect influence of constitutional rights upon plea-bargained 
outcomes. As in the criminal adjudication context, the actual 
138. See, e.g., Order Staying Proceedings, Batarfi v. Gates, No. 05-0409 (EGS), dkt. 
178 (D.D.C. March 30, 2009) (on file with author) (staying proceedings to allow taskforce 
to accomplish petitioner's transfer). 
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exercise of constitutional rights in habeas may be less important 
than the "shadow" cast by the government's expectation of those 
rights.139 Detention policy thus largely unspools in the shadow of 
the Suspension Clause, not under its direct gaze. In the criminal 
context, a small number of cases do not settle through pleas 
because of the inability of lawyers on each side to converge in 
their assessment of the expected trial outcome. Similarly, the 
residual core of litigated habeas may be explained by the 
persistence of uncertainty as to trial outcomes. Habeas cases that 
proceed to judgment represent instances of high variance in 
litigants' expectations about outcomes. While the government 
believes it has a strong case, detainee counsel believe that it is 
only bureaucratic inefficiencies or sheer error that blocks 
release. District court litigation, on this account, is a product of 
epistemic uncertainty about the bases for detention as between 
habeas counsel and their government counterparts. 
However the litigation is explained, its effect at the margin 
is small -at most 3 .75 % and perhaps little as zero. So if Justice 
Kennedy is right to point to a connection between habeas and 
the freedom from unlawful constraints on physical liberty, the 
connection is at best complex and indirect. Further, the data 
reviewed in this essay are simply too ambiguous to confirm such 
a relationship, even if they are sufficient to reject the thesis that 
the relationship is a large one. The available public record is far 
too hazy to permit any precise estimate of habeas's effect on 
executive detention policy, beyond the conclusion that any direct 
effect is likely small. Moreover, the forms of habeas review 
remain very much a work in progress, subject to congressional or 
high court reworking. 
Despite this uncertainty, I will recklessly hazard here some 
predictions. First, easy cases for release will run out as low­
hanging fruit are consumed.140 Increasingly, detainees will lose in 
the district courts, particularly since the D.C. Circuit's judgment 
in Kiyemba v. Obama141 signals the circuit court's limited 
tolerance for creative remedial options. The Supreme Court's 
decision to send that case back to the lower courts based on 
139. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 289, 309-17 (1983). But see Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow 
of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004) (challenging the "shadow-of-trial" model) . 
140. See, e.g., Order Staying Proceedings, Batarfi v. Gates, supra note 138, (staying 
proceedings to allow taskforce to accomplish petitioner's transfer) . 
141. 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009), vacated and 
remanded, 130 S. Ct. 1235, (2010) aff'd on remand 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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government assertions of changed facts , rather than addressing it 
on the merits, further signals that the high court is unwilling to 
interfere too much with political branch choices. Those 
detainees who prevail, but do not secure release because of 
forward-looking risk assessments by the interagency taskforce,142 
will also obtain less and less sympathy on the remedial front. 
District courts judges have already expressed unease at pushing 
too hard upon the Executive. In a December 2009 hearing, for 
example, Chief Judge Hogan bemoaned the "unfortunate" fact 
that "the Legislative Branch of our government, and the 
Executive Branch have not moved more strongly to Erovide 
uniform clear rules and laws for handling these cases ." 1  3 More 
tellingly, even the release orders currently issued in the habeas 
actions do not call directly for physical release. In ambiguous 
terms, most require the government to engage in "all necessary 
and appropriate diplomatic steps to facilitate" release.144 Only 
two, Judge Huvelle's order concerning the juvenile detainee 
Muhammed Jawad and Judge Kessler's concerning Alla Ali bin 
Ali Ahmed, directly order release.145 Jawad's case, though, was 
exceptional, and had already been a subject of controversy. 146 
This pattern suggests that while courts might press the 
government on procedural and evidentiary issues, there remains 
142. The taskforce completed its assessment in January 2010, and recommended that 
about fifty detainees be detained under law-of-war authority. See Peter Finn, Panel on 
Guantanamo Backs Indefinite Detention for Some, WASH. POST, Jan., 22, 2010, at Al. 
Notably, it seems as if that the presence of a judicial release order is merely one factor 
(of many) the taskforce considered in determining whether release was appropriate. 
143. Transcript of Hearing before Hon. Thomas F. Hogan, Abdu Anam v. Obama, 
No. CA 01-1 194, at 6-7 (D.C.C. Dec. 14, 2009) (copy on file with author). 
144. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51 ,  66 (D.D.C. 2009) (Kessler, J.); 
see also Al-Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 130 (D.D.C. 2009) (Leon, J.) (same); 
Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35-36 (D.D.C. 2009) (Huvelle, J.) (same); Al­
Rabiah v. Obama, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 ,  42 (D.D.C. 2009) (Collar-Kotelly, J.). 
145. See Order, Bacha v. Obama, No, 05-2385 (EJH) at 1 (D.D.C. July 30, 2009), 
available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/jawad_court_ 
order.pdf (ordering that "beginning on August 21, 2009, when 15 days following the 
submission of the aforesaid information to the Congress have passed, respondents shall 
promptly release petitioner Jawad from detention at the U.S. Naval Station at 
Guantanamo Bay and transfer him to the custody of the receiving government"); Ahmed 
v. Obama, No. 05-1678 (GK), dkt. 249 (D.C.C. Oct., 1 2009) (on file with author). Thanks 
to Shane Kadidal for providing a copy of this document. I am dubious that the D.C. 
Circuit's since vacated opinion in Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), can 
explain the district courts' behavior. While several district courts have invoked Kiyemba 
in softening the terms of a release order, in fact Judge Leon began issuing non-release 
final orders before Kiyemba was handed down. Still, Kiyemba's disavowal of effective 
relief likely had an in terrorem effect, and likely will continue to do. 
146. See William Glaberson, Guantanamo Prosecutor Is Quitting in Dispute Over a 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2008, at A20. 
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at bottom a concern about noncompliance. That is, courts 
continue to tread cautiously in the post-Boumediene habeas 
cases, unsure of the boundaries of their own ability to press the 
Administration to alter course. When push comes to shove, 
molar security concerns will dominate granular liberty interests, 
even for detainees found to be unconnected to any terrorist 
group. 
At the same time that indirect and direct effects of habeas 
jurisdiction fade, the federal courts have done just enough to 
deflate significant social mobilization in favor of further releases. 
Boumediene celebrates legality but without furnishing any 
constraining law. At the time of this writing, the received 
wisdom in policy circles147 calls for fresh legislative involvement 
in detention issues. Such calls are made under circumstances 
wherein the only kind of legislative action that could pass both 
Houses would expand detention authority and further restrict 
the fragmented and incomplete influence of habeas review. The 
calls for legislation not only trade on a critique of judicial 
activism with partisan roots, but, more importantly, fail to 
account accurately for either the subordinate position of courts 
or the primacy of political actors' efforts to anticipate, 
circumvent, and otherwise marginalize judicial action. The 
Court, that is, has largely succeeded in diffusing effective 
libertarian political mobilization around detention as a national 
policy issue without achieving large policy change on the ground. 
This analysis further has implications for future research. 
Important recent scholarship on habeas has focused on 
procedural questions of proof and evidentiary standards as a 
locus of "significant rsolicy questions about competing risks and 
their distributions."1 8 More ambitiously, other scholars have 
asserted that the courts use procedure "as a corrective to 
decision-making by one (or both) of the political branches."149 
147. See BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT CHESNEY & RABEA BENHALIM, THE 
EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION: THE GUANTANAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING 
1 (2010), http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0122_guan tanamo _ 
wittes_chesney /0122_guantanamo _ wittes_chesney. pdf. 
148. Matthew C. Waxman, Facing the Challenges of Continued Detention and 
Repatriation: Guantanamo, Habeas Corpus, and Standards of Proof" Viewing the Law 
Through Multiple Lens, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 245, 246 (2009); see generally Jenny 
Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on Terror, '' 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013 
(2008). 
149. Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Executive 
Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661 ,  665 (2009). Oddly, Landau largely relies on 
opinions by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the scope of review under the 
now defunct Detainee Treatment Act § 1005(e)(2), 10 U.S.C.§ 801 . Cf Bismullah v. 
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Although this procedural tum rnay produce valuable insights, it 
should be complemented with an effort to understand the 
incentives and felt limitations confronting federal judges in the 
habeas cases. How conscious, for example, are judges of political 
constraints on their ultimate remedial authority? To the extent 
that the judiciary's relationship with the Bush Administration 
came to be characterized by mistrust, has the shift to the Obama 
Administration sapped judges' incentives to regulate detention 
decisions closely? However tricky such questions are to answer 
for evidentiary reasons, it may well be that the perceived balance 
of authority and legitimacy between the judicial and executive 
branches shapes the course of habeas litigation more than 
doctrinal formulations that until now have attracted legal 
scholars ' attention. 
CONCLUSION 
Boumediene has been called "one of the most important 
Supreme Court decisions in recent years. "150 But at best 
Boumediene secured liberty from unlawful constraint only at the 
margins -the most important work had been done long before 
by Rasul and Hamdi - and failed in its pursuit of a more 
ambitious separation-of-powers aim. The analysis here does not 
condemn habeas as wholly ineffective. Rather, it suggests that 
misty nostrums of separated powers provide little guidance or 
insight into how federal courts and their coordinate political 
branches interact to benefit or burden the exercise of human 
liberty. The effects of habeas jurisdiction have been uncertain 
and perhaps marginal. Before better data illuminates the 
relationship between judicial actions and executive policy, 
rhetoric either praising or condemning Boumediene is at a 
minimum premature. 
Gates, 551 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (invalidating §1005(e)(2) as nonseverable 
from portions of the later-enacted Military Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 
120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 (2006) (codified at 28 U.S.C.§ 2241(e)). 
150. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 18. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
Data for the Figures 1, 2, and 4 and Table 1 were derived in 
the following way. The Department of Defense and Department 
of Justice websites contain archives of daily press releases that 
each relate to a release from Guantanamo and that each include 
the number of detainees remaining on the base at a certain date, 
and the total number released up to that point. These statistics 
were recorded, double-checked, and cross-referenced against 
press sources and other compilations of data. The data was also 
cross-referenced and supplemented with press reports from the 
end of the relevant time period. Annualized release data was 
calculated by subtracting reported statistics from the last press 
release of one year from the reported statistic on the last press 
release of the next year. 
The data in Figure 4 derive from an additional source. On 
the one hand, the data of "non-habeas releases" comes from the 
aforementioned press releases. Data about "habeas releases" 
was derived from Propublica, the New York Times, and the 
Brookings Institute, and then cross-referenced against the press 
releases . This was possible because the government issued press 
releases after a person was released subsequent to a district 
court habeas decision as well as in the absence of such a 
decision. In general, it was possible to corroborate release 
claims. Data for Figure 3 was drawn from two articles in the New 
York Times. The government keeps no running tally of Bagram 
detentions in public portions of its websites. 
